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Executive Summary 
Is Alan Greenspan to blame for the current 
ousing bubble and the ongoing financial crisis? A 
rowing chorus charges the former Federal Reserve 
hairman with being an “inflationist” whose loose 
onetary policy caused or significantly con­
ibuted to our current economic troubles. How­
ver, although Greenspan’s policies weren’t perfect, 
is monetary policy was in fact tight, and his legacy 
 one of having overseen low and stable inflation 
nd a striking dampening of the business cycle. 
Critics charge Greenspan with having carried 
n an excessively expansionary monetary policy, 
articularly following the recession of 2001. They 
ote how low interest rates were from 2002 
rough 2004 and argue that those low rates 
aved the way for everything from high prices at 
e pump to high prices at the supermarket, from 
e housing crisis to the financial crisis. 
In so doing, those critics make the classic mis­
take of using interest rates to evaluate monetary 
policy, reasoning that if interest rates are low, 
recent monetary policy must have been expansion­
ary. It is not the Federal Reserve but supply and 
demand that ultimately determines interest rates. 
Although central banks can push rates up or down 
to some degree, the globally integrated financial 
system reduces the Fed’s ability to significantly 
influence rates. 
This paper should not be construed as a 
defense of all of Greenspan’s policies, nor of cen­
tral banking or the Federal Reserve. In fact, our 
preference would be to abolish the Fed and 
deregulate the banking industry. Barring that, 
we argue that Federal Reserve policy ought to 
abide by the rules rather than the discretion of 
its chairman. 
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Critics are now 
charging 
Greenspan with 
having carried on 
an excessively 
expansionary 
monetary policy, 
particularly 
following the 
recession of 2001. 
But an objective 
examination of his 
record of nearly 
two decades shows 
that he did not. 
Introduction 
Former Federal Reserve chairman Alan 
Greenspan has become everyone’s favorite 
scapegoat. His policies allegedly caused, or at 
least contributed to, the current financial cri­
sis. He is attacked from the left for lax finan­
cial regulation, from the right for loose mone­
tary policy, and from the middle for both. Yet 
two years ago, on leaving office, Greenspan 
was widely heralded as a financial wizard 
whose wise, discretionary macromanagement 
had brought an unprecedented two decades of 
low inflation, high prosperity, and infrequent 
and mild recessions. Both viewpoints, in reali­
ty, are mistaken.1 
During the Keynesian dark ages, persisting 
through the mid­1970s, no one, except a few 
monetary cranks along with monetarist econ­
omists cloistered in their academic ivory tow­
ers, believed that the Federal Reserve’s mone­
tary policy even mattered. This was a period 
when Paul Samuelson, who would go on to 
win the 1970 Nobel Prize in Economics the sec­
ond time it was awarded, could proclaim in a 
1969 Newsweek column that “there is no sight 
in the world more awful than that of an old­
time economist, foam­flecked at the mouth 
and hell­bent to cure inflation by monetary 
discipline. God willing, we shan’t soon see his 
like again.” Today almost everyone—econo­
mists, investors, and the general public alike— 
seems to have swerved to the opposite extreme. 
The Fed not only controls inflation but 
allegedly everything else that happens to the 
American economy, whether good or bad. The 
truth, however, is somewhere in the middle.2 
We are not arguing that Greenspan’s poli­
cies were perfect. Nor should anything that 
follows be construed as a defense of central 
banking or of the Federal Reserve. Particularly 
alarming is the way the lender­of­last­resort 
function has been expanding the moral­haz­
ard safety net and mispricing risk, a trend to 
which Greenspan no doubt contributed. Our 
preferred ideal would combine abolition of 
the Fed and unregulated free banking. 
Nonetheless, Alan Greenspan stands out as 
the most competent—and arguably the only 
competent—helmsman of United States mon­
etary policy since the creation of the Federal 
Reserve System. As Milton Friedman observed 
upon Greenspan’s retirement, “For the first 70 
years after it opened in 1914, the Fed did far 
more harm than good, presiding over infla­
tion in two World Wars, converting a moder­
ate recession into the great depression, and 
then in 1970s, producing the most serious 
peacetime inflation in our nation’s history.” 
By contrast, Greenspan’s “performance has 
indeed been remarkable.”3 
Greenspan not only oversaw relatively low 
and stable inflation, but also ushered in a 
striking decline in the volatility of real gross 
domestic product. Although defenders of 
macroeconomic intervention often suggest 
that government policies after World War II 
dampened business cycles, the truly signifi­
cant change should be dated at 1987, the year 
Greenspan assumed office. The current fuss 
about a recession that may not even have hap­
pened yet testifies to how high his legacy has 
raised the bar. Until a year or so ago, many 
observers had therefore credited Greenspan 
with being the best at reading the economic 
tea leaves. But as we will demonstrate, the 
source of Greenspan’s apparent success has 
little to do with monetary discretion.4 
Freezing Total Reserves 
Recently converted critics are now charg­
ing Greenspan with having carried on an 
excessively expansionary monetary policy, 
particularly following the recession of 2001 
and possibly during the dot­com boom that 
preceded it. But an objective examination of 
his record of nearly two decades shows that 
he did not. Instead, however unintentionally 
and unwittingly, he came close to freezing 
the domestic monetary base and deregulated 
the broader monetary aggregates. 
Why do people now believe Greenspan was 
an “inflationist”? For one main reason: they 
note how low interest rates were from 2002 
through 2004. But interest rates have never 
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proved an adequate gauge of what the Fed is 
doing: not during the Great Depression, when 
rates were very low despite a collapsing money 
stock; not during the Great Inflation of the 
1970s, when rates were high despite an ex­
panding money stock; and not under Green­
span. A focus on interest rates not only 
obscures the well­known distinction between 
nominal and real rates (nominal rates equal 
real rates plus expected inflation), it also 
ignores the simple fact that interest rates can 
change as a result of real factors involving sup­
ply and demand. 
The market ultimately determines interest 
rates. Although central banks are big enough 
players in the loan market (and the quintes­
sential noise traders to boot) that they can 
push short­term rates up or down somewhat, 
that ability is increasingly diminished, even for 
a major central bank like the Fed, as globaliza­
tion integrates world financial markets. In 
defending his actions, Greenspan is correct in 
attributing the unusually low interest rates 
early this decade mainly to a massive flow of 
savings from emerging Asian economies and 
elsewhere.5 
A better, although now unfashionable, way 
to judge monetary policy is to look at the mon­
etary measures: MZM, M2, M1, and the mone­
tary base. Since 2001, the annual year­to­year 
growth rate of MZM fell from over 20 percent 
to nearly 0 percent by 2006. During that same 
time, M2 growth fell from over 10 percent to 
around 2 percent and M1 growth fell from over 
10 percent to negative rates. Admittedly the 
Fed’s control over the broader monetary aggre­
gates has become quite attenuated, for reasons 
elucidated below. But even the year­to­year 
annual growth rate of the monetary base since 
2001 fell from 10 percent to below 5 percent in 
2006 and by June of 2008 was around 1.5 per­
cent, despite Ben S. Bernanke’s alleged refla­
tion. When all of these measures agree, it sug­
gests that monetary policy was not all that 
expansionary during 2002 and 2003 under 
Greenspan, despite the low interest rates.6 
The key to what was really going on is the 
monetary base, which the Federal Reserve 
directly controls. The base consists of reserves 
held by the banks and other depositories, 
either in their accounts at the Fed or as vault 
cash, plus currency in circulation among the 
general public. Between December 1986, 8 
months before Greenspan became Fed chair­
man, and December 2005, 19 years later, the 
monetary base rose by a hefty amount, from 
$248 billion to $802 billion (no figures are sea­
sonally adjusted). True, that doesn’t sound like 
a freeze. But virtually the whole increase was in 
currency in circulation. (See Figure 1.) During 
that same time, total bank reserves grew from 
$65 billion to $73 billion, for an average annu­
al growth rate of a mere 0.65 percent. (These 
figures are unadjusted for any changes in 
reserve requirements and—unlike the some­
what misleading reserve totals reported by the 
Fed’s board of governors—include all vault 
cash, clearing balances, and float.) In some 
years aggregate reserves rose; in others they fell, 
with the major bump surrounding Y2K, when 
the accumulation of reserves by banks appears 
to have induced the Fed to accommodate a 40 
percent jump followed by a 30­percent drop. 
Total reserves are also the one monetary mea­
sure that show a slight uptick into 2003, when 
interest rates were down.7 
During the same 19 years, currency in cir­
culation exploded faster than the monetary 
base, at an annual rate of 7.54 percent. Prior to 
this explosion, currency was less than three 
quarters of the total monetary base; today it is 
over 90 percent. In a period when debit cards 
and possibly ATMs were reducing currency 
demand, analysts were aware that all this new 
cash was not bulging in the wallets and purses 
of the average American. It was going abroad, 
as a stable dollar evolved into an international 
currency. These growing foreign holdings of 
Federal Reserve notes became an additional 
factor increasing money demand and keeping 
U.S. inflation in check during the 1990s.8 
Ideally we should adjust the monetary 
base and monetary aggregates downward, to 
account for this drain abroad. Richard G. 
Anderson of the St. Louis Fed estimates that 
the proportion of U.S. currency held abroad 
doubled between 1986 and 2005, from 25 to 
nearly 50 percent. Although his estimates 
When all of these 
measures agree, 
it suggests that 
monetary policy 
was not all that 
expansionary 
during 2002 and 
2003 under 
Greenspan, 
despite the low 
interest rates. 
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Figure 1 
Monetary Base (in billions) 
Reserves 
Milton Friedman, 
in the 1980s, had 
recommended 
something 
similar to what 
Greenspan did 
de facto: freeze 
the base. 
may be too low, the Fed makes no such ad­
justment. Doing so would reduce the annual 
growth rate of the monetary base between 
December 1986 and December 2005 from 6.4 
to 4.9 percent.9 
Furthermore, in a fully deregulated mone­
tary system, private banks—not the Fed— 
would be the institutions issuing currency. 
Currency would become an additional bank 
liability like deposits, responding to market 
forces. The Fed tries to duplicate this result by 
allowing the public to determine how much of 
the base becomes currency. In other words, it 
controls only the total base whereas currency 
passively expands to accommodate people’s 
preferences. This suggests that a more mean­
ingful approximation of the base would be 
simply to subtract all currency in circulation, 
leaving us with only aggregate reserves as our 
proxy. Thus, the virtual freezing of reserves 
turns out to be the most salient yet ignored 
feature of Greenspan’s tenure. Interestingly, 
the late Milton Friedman, in the 1980s, had 
recommended something similar to what 
Greenspan did de facto: freeze the base.10 
Greenspan also helped deregulate the 
broader monetary aggregates: M2, MZM, and 
M3. The Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 had begun 
phasing out interest­rate ceilings on deposits 
and modified reserve requirements in complex 
ways. Combined with subsequent administra­
tive deregulation under Greenspan through 
January 1994, these changes left all the finan­
cial liabilities that M2 adds to M1—savings 
deposits, small time deposits, money market 
deposit accounts, and retail money market 
mutual fund shares—utterly free of reserve 
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requirements and allowed banks to reclassify 
many M1 checking accounts as M2 savings 
deposits. M2 and the broader measures 
became quasi­deregulated aggregates with no 
legal link to the size of the monetary base.11 
A result, and one that Milton Friedman 
noted in 2003, is that changes in the velocity of 
M2 were automatically offset by changes in the 
amount of M2. Interestingly, this is exactly 
what monetary economists George A. Selgin 
and Lawrence H. White predicted would hap­
pen under free banking, that is, a market­deter­
mined monetary system without any govern­
ment involvement. They argued that free 
banking would automatically adjust the quan­
tity of money to changes in velocity. If velocity 
rose, signaling a fall in money demand, market 
mechanisms would cause banks to reduce the 
quantity of money they created. And if velocity 
fell, signaling a rise in money demand, banks 
would enlarge the quantity of money. The 
response of M2 to changes in velocity in the 
1990s offers stunning confirmation of this 
claim. The result was that inflation was held in 
check.12 
Thus, during the dot­com boom of the 90s, 
the velocity of M2 rose as people shifted into 
stocks. But this was perfectly offset by the 
declining growth rate of M2, which fell to near 
zero between 1994 and 1996. Assorted Fed 
watchers reached opposite conclusions, depend­
ing on which variable they chose to focus on. 
Some warned that Greenspan’s policies were 
deflationary, while others looked at the higher 
growth rates of the base and M1, which remains 
more closely tied to the base and more distorted 
by currency going abroad, and predicted higher 
inflation. Both were wide of the mark, of course, 
but not because of Greenspan’s miraculous cen­
tral­bank discretion. The result was a product of 
market process, and when the collapse of the 
dot­com boom burst the M2 velocity bubble, it 
induced a new spike in M2 growth.13 
Why Any Inflation? 
If Greenspan approximately froze total 
reserves, why was there any inflation at all dur­
ing his tenure? Rather than averaging 2.5 per­
cent annually, shouldn’t prices have remained 
constant or actually fallen? The answer relates 
to the market’s extraordinary capacity for 
financial innovation. Because bank reserves in 
the U.S. currently pay no interest (except for 
required clearing balances arising from the 
Fed’s check­clearing operations), banks have a 
strong incentive to economize on their use. 
They can figure out ways to do so even under 
reserve requirements, as amply illustrated by 
the origins and growth of the Federal funds 
market, where banks regularly loan each other 
excess reserves. Financial deregulation gave the 
process an additional boost. From December 
1986 to December 2005, the same period dur­
ing which aggregate reserves remained almost 
constant, the aggregate, de facto reserve ratio 
of the banking system as whole backing M2 fell 
in half: from 2.52 percent to 1.23 percent. So 
the quantity of M2 deposits grew at a secular 
rate of 4.6 percent, enough to generate mild, 
positive, sustained inflation. And the quantity 
of domestically held currency grew alongside at 
an accommodating rate.14 
This steady, long­term decline of reserve 
ratios cannot easily be halted and confronts 
government fiat money with a fatal long­run 
problem. Retightening of reserve requirements 
would only burden banks with an implicit tax 
not faced by other financial institutions, 
encouraging the development of new, highly 
liquid money substitutes that effectively evade 
the requirements. Congress has, moreover, 
moved in the opposite direction, permitting the 
Fed to eliminate all remaining reserve require­
ments in 2011, thereby bringing the U.S. into 
line with such countries as Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
Sweden, which have already done so. The same 
act, the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act 
of 2006, also authorizes the Fed, beginning in 
2011, to pay interest on bank reserves held as 
deposits with the Fed. But any resulting 
increase in the demand for bank reserves stems 
from, in effect, transforming that portion of the 
monetary base into Treasury securities.15 
In short, the ongoing spread of electronic 
funds transfers and assorted cashless pay­
The ongoing 
spread of 
electronic funds 
transfers and 
assorted cashless 
payments are 
essentially replac­
ing money with a 
sophisticated 
network of 
computerized 
barter. 
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Rather than 
demonstrating 
that monetarist 
rules are obsolete 
and free banking 
unnecessary, 
Greenspan’s 
policies suggest 
that the more 
thoroughly either 
of those two 
objectives is 
implemented, 
the greater the 
macroeconomic 
stability our 
economy will 
enjoy. 
ments are essentially replacing money with a 
sophisticated network of computerized barter. 
The demand for base money will thus asymp­
totically approach zero. As long as the base 
remains fiat money, with no other source of 
demand, the price level will inexorably head 
toward infinity. Only a commodity base, with 
a nonmonetary demand—say gold, although 
it could just as well be silver, some combina­
tion of the two, or a more complex basket of 
commodities or financial assets—will anchor 
the price level over the long haul. Gold will 
continue to provide the unit of account, the 
common numeraire in nearly all transactions, 
without ever needing to be used as a medium 
of exchange.16 
Greenspan cannot be held responsible for 
this ultimate lack of viability of fiat money, 
although his deregulation accelerated the 
inflationary bias. A steady, secular contraction 
of total reserves could in theory have offset the 
declining reserve ratio, delivering a constant 
price level or even secular deflation over the 
last two decades. But the continued fall of 
base­money demand is itself inevitable, as long 
as developed economies wish to capture the 
enormous welfare gains of financial innova­
tion and a more efficient allocation of savings. 
Conclusion 
So what actually caused the current finan­
cial crisis? That is similar to asking what caused 
the minor recessions of 1990 and 2001. Unlike 
the cause of inflation, the cause of business 
cycles is not obvious, which is why economists 
still vigorously debate the question. Minor blips 
in total reserves under Greenspan may have 
played some poorly understood role in any of 
these three events. Because Greenspan only 
imperfectly implemented Milton Friedman’s 
rule of freezing the monetary base, without 
intending to do so, his policy may have ended 
up slightly too discretionary. But that possibility 
hardly justifies the “asset bubble” hubris of 
those economic prognosticators who, only well 
after the fact, declaim with absolutely certainty 
and scant attention to the monetary measures, 
how the Fed could have pricked or prevented 
such bubbles. 
The misunderstanding of Alan Greenspan’s 
management of the U.S. money stock has an 
ironic coda. Before his appointment, the 
Federal Reserve had proved so palpably inept 
as to all but discredit discretionary monetary 
policy. Both monetarist rules and free banking 
were gaining adherents among economists. 
But today, despite the recent financial turmoil, 
most observers interpret Greenspan’s record as 
showing either that discretionary policy can be 
done right or that what is needed is some 
activist pseudo­rule such as that developed by 
John B. Taylor of Stanford University. Central 
bankers, after half a century or more of failure, 
have allegedly learned from their past mistakes. 
Finally, according to this view, they have the 
knowledge to centrally plan the money stock 
properly.17 
In a review of Greenspan’s memoirs, Harvard 
economist Benjamin Friedman claims that 
Greenspan was a practitioner par excellence of 
monetary discretion (despite his paying lip ser­
vice to laissez faire) and that Greenspan’s major 
failing was that he was not more of a regulator. 
Benjamin Friedman is wrong on both counts. 
Greenspan, like the Wizard of Oz, was a lousy 
wizard—but he was a good deregulator. And 
that made all the difference. His success stems 
from the approximation of a rigid monetary 
rule and the very deregulation that Benjamin 
Friedman deplores. Rather than demonstrating 
that monetarist rules are obsolete and free bank­
ing unnecessary, Greenspan’s policies suggest 
that the more thoroughly either of those two 
objectives is implemented, the greater the 
macroeconomic stability our economy will 
enjoy.18 
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1. Compare, for instance, the criticism of Green­
span in “The Bernanke Reflation,” Wall Street 
Journal, February 29, 2008, p. A16, with the earlier 
praise of Greenspan in “The Chairman’s Mystique,” 
Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2006, p. A14. 
2. Newsweek column for June 1969, reprinted in 
Paul Samuelson, The Samuelson Sampler (Glen 
Ridge, NJ: Thomas Horton, 1973), p. 55. 
3. Milton Friedman, “The Greenspan Story: ‘He 
Has Set a Standard,’” Wall Street Journal, January 31, 
2006, p. A14. 
4. Christina D. Romer was the first to point out 
that the apparent improvement of the U.S. macro­
economy after World War II was a statistical anom­
aly, in “Spurious Volatility in Historical Unemploy­
ment Data,” Journal of Political Economy 94 (February 
1986): 1–17; and “Is the Stabilization of the Postwar 
Economy a Figment of the Data,” American Eco­
nomic Review 76 (June 1986): 314–34. Although her 
strong claim of no difference between prewar and 
postwar performance (after throwing out the Great 
Depression as a statistical outlier) is controversial, 
even her strongest critics cannot deny that the 
improvement beginning around 1987 has dwarfed 
any postwar improvement. 
5. Alan Greenspan, The Age of Turbulence: Adventures 
in a New World (New York: Penguin Press, 2007), pp. 
385–88; Alan Greenspan, “A Response to My 
Critics, Financial Times, April 6, 2008; and Greg Ip, 
“His Legacy Tarnished, Greenspan Goes on 
Defensive,” Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2008. This 
explanation was anticipated by Ben S. Bernanke, 
before he replaced Greenspan as chair of the Fed, in 
“The Global Saving Glut and the U.S. Current 
Account Deficit,” March 10, 2005, http://www.fed 
eralreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/2005 
03102/default.htm. Agreeing with Greenspan is 
financial columnist Martin Wolf, “Why Greenspan 
Does Not Bear Most of the Blame,” Financial Times, 
April 9, 2008. See also Diego Valderrama, “Are 
Global Imbalances Due to Financial Underdevelop­
ment of Emerging Economies?” Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter no. 2008­
12, April 12, 2008. One of the strongest academic 
critics of the Greenspan­Bernanke savings­glut the­
sis is John B. Taylor, “Housing and Monetary 
Policy,” Remarks before the Symposium on Hous­
ing, Housing Finance, and Monetary Policy, Jack­
son Hole, Wyoming.), www.stanford.edu/~johntayl 
/Housing%20and%20Monetary%20Policy—Tay 
lor—Jackson%20Hole%202007.pdf. But Taylor’s 
condemnation of Greenspan is mainly for his fail­
ure to raise the Federal Funds rate sooner, not for 
his pushing it down too far initially. For statistical 
analysis of world savings over this period, see 
International Monetary Fund, “Global Imbalances: 
A Saving and Investment Perspective,” World 
Economic Outlook, September 2005, pp. 91–124. 
6. All of our numbers come from the enormously 
convenient website of the St. Louis Federal Reserve, 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. M1 consists 
of currency in circulation, travelers’ checks, and 
transaction deposits (accounts that permit unlim­
ited checking). M2 adds to M1 savings deposits, 
small time deposits, money market deposit 
accounts, and retail money market mutual fund 
shares. M3 (which the Fed ceased reporting in 
March 2006) adds to M2 bank­issued repurchase 
agreements, Eurodollar deposits held by U.S. resi­
dents in foreign branches of U.S. banks, large cer­
tificates of deposit (over $100,000), and institu­
tional money market mutual fund shares. MZM 
(short for Money of Zero Maturity and reported 
only by the St. Louis Fed) is M2 minus small time 
deposits plus institutional money market mutual 
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7. For the monetary base, we have used Board of 
Governors Monetary Base (monthly and not sea­
sonally adjusted), Not Adjusted for Changes in 
Reserve Requirements: BOGUMBNS. For currency 
in circulation, we have used Currency Component 
of M1 (monthly and not seasonally adjusted): 
CURRNS. We have subtracted the latter from the 
former to get total reserves. The St. Louis Fed web­
site does give several alternative direct estimates of 
reserves. But those compiled by the St. Louis Fed 
are adjusted for changes in reserve requirements, 
whereas those compiled by the board of governors 
exclude any excess reserves held in the form of vault 
cash, all required clearing balances, and Fed float. 
(You can find this critical detail only in the foot­
notes of the Fed’s H.3 release.) For some idea of 
how massive the resulting distortion can be, con­
sider December 2007. The board of governors 
reported total reserves (monthly, not seasonally, 
adjusted, and not adjusted for changes in reserve 
requirements) of $42.7 billion. If you add in vault 
cash not covering reserve requirements, that num­
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board’s estimate. If the distortion were consistent 
across time, the board’s reserve totals would still 
tell us something. But the distortion is not close to 
consistent across time, in part because banks 
increasingly used vault cash in their ATMs. 
Required clearing balances arise out of the Fed’s 
check­clearing operations, pay interest, and are 
explained in E. J. Stevens, “Required Clearing 
Balances,” Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Economic 
Review 29 (1993, Quarter 4): 2–14. 
8. Debit cards unambiguously reduce the demand 
for currency. ATMs have two opposing impacts. By 
making currency more readily available, ATMs 
tend to both increase the number of currency 
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amounts. The annual growth rate is about 4 percent 
over a comparable period. Federal Reserve Bulletin 
no. 73, March 1987, pp. A4, A10, and Federal 
Reserve Statistical Release H.4.1, “Factors Affecting 
Reserve Balances,” December 29, 2005. 
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